China has emerged as a key player in Iran's escalating confrontation with the United States, as mass protests and economic collapse strain the Islamic Republic from within.
In early January, widespread demonstrations driven by economic hardship, political discontent and sustained foreign pressure posed one of the most serious domestic challenges Iran's leadership has faced in years.
The unrest soon gave way to a sharpening regional standoff, as President Donald Trump ordered large US military deployments to the Middle East and issued warnings demanding that Iran curb its nuclear program and ballistic missile development.
During the protests, China reportedly assisted Iranian authorities in implementing a nationwide communications blackout.
On January 15, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also condemned US threats as a return to the "law of the jungle," contrasting what he described as American aggression with China's offer to play a "constructive role" in helping the Iranian government and people "stand united."
On Saturday, January 31, amid heightened tensions with Washington, Iranian state media reported that Iran plans to hold joint naval exercises with China and Russia in mid-February in the northern Indian Ocean.
The announcement was followed by a surge of unconfirmed claims online alleging that China was supplying military assistance to Iran, as well as speculations over whether the Chinese government would intervene in the event of a US military confrontation.
Iran deepens ties with China
For years, China has been one of Iran's most important economic and diplomatic partners, providing a crucial outlet as Tehran has faced sweeping US sanctions and remained on the Financial Action Task Force's blacklist. These restrictions have severely limited Iran's access to the global financial system and made it dependent on China for trade and political support.
That relationship has taken on a sharper security dimension ever since Iran's 12-day war with Israel in June 2025. In the months afterward, Iran and China reportedly expanded security cooperation agreements designed to improve intelligence sharing and coordination against perceived external threats.
However, Hamidreza Azizi, a Middle East security analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (SWP) in Berlin, cautions against overestimating Beijing's commitment to defending the Iranian government. He said China's involvement in Iran and the wider region remains largely pragmatic.
"China did not emerge as a forceful defender of Iran after the 12-day war with Israel, and it is unlikely to do so in the event of a possible US military intervention," Azizi told DW.
By contrast, China has provided more robust support to other regional partners. During the 2025 clashes between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Beijing offered Pakistan tangible military assistance, according to sources including Indian military officials. No comparable level of support has been extended to Iran, Azizi noted.
Iran's relationship with China is primarily shaped by confrontation with Washington. While US sanctions have pushed Iran closer to China, they have also constrained Chinese investment and limited China's ability to expand its economic footprint in Iran.
"For now, Beijing appears more focused on opposing unilateral US action than on ensuring the survival of the Iranian regime itself," Azizi said. "Years of recurring unrest and widespread corruption in Iran have also reinforced perceptions in China that the country under the current leadership represents a high-risk environment for investment."
This caution is particularly evident in the huge gap between China's trade with Iran and its trade with other Gulf countries. In 2024, China's total trade with the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, reached roughly $257 billion (€217 billion), according to a report by the London-based think tank Asia House. China's bilateral trade with Iran was only a fraction of that and totaled less than $14 billion the same year, according to Chinese government data.
"So while China does want the region to remain stable to protect its broad economic and energy interests, it is unlikely to go out of its way to defend the government in Iran itself," Azizi said.
What risks would the US run with an attack on Iran?
To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video
China, Iran, and the “Axis of Upheaval”
In the US, the partnership between Iran and China is often cited as part of what has been portrayed as an "Axis of Upheaval." The term refers to the growing strategic, military and economic alignment between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea — sometimes abbreviated as CRINK — aimed at challenging the US-led global order.
European and NATO officials have also noted this convergence. NATO chief Mark Rutte, speaking at the meeting in the European Parliament on January 26, said, "It is undeniable that, as we speak, Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are aligning more and more." He added that while the partnership "is not yet well structured," these countries are increasingly willing to challenge Western influence.
In US policy circles, this perspective has sometimes framed the idea that weakening Iran could help curb China's power.
According to Azizi, such thinking has contributed to a more confrontational approach toward Tehran and has been a key factor in pushing Iran closer to China and Russia.
"But the truth is, Iran needs China more than China needs Iran," Azizi said.
"So to think that pressuring Tehran will hurt China is mistaken. Overestimating the importance of this alliance would be a miscalculation both for the Iranian government and the US."
